The first case of cyberwar in non-international armed conflict? The matrix in Iraq by Turns, David
The First Case of Cyberwar in Non-International Armed Conflict? The Matrix in Iraq 
By: David Turns 
The multi-faction insurgency that has been tearing Iraq apart ever since the fall of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003 has often involved the use of such crude and indiscriminate 
methods and means of warfare as the suicide bomb and the improvised explosive device. 
But in mid-2014 there were reports that some aspects of the armed conflict had risen to 
unexpected heights of contemporary sophistication, with the apparent use of cyberspace as 
a domain for hostilities. These manifestations included reports of computer hacking to 
gather intelligence, malware attack programmes to subvert and exercise remote control 
over hostile computer networks, the use of booby-trapped messages on email, and the use 
of social media to spread fear in specifically-targeted sectors of the population.1 Whereas 
the only previous recorded use of cyberwar within the context of an actual armed conflict 
occurred in a situation that was clearly international in nature (the South Ossetia War of 
2008 between Russia and Georgia),2 the conflict in Iraq is at present equally undoubtedly a 
non-international one. The moment is therefore opportune to consider the application of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) to cyber hostilities in non-international armed conflicts 
(NIAC) generally, as well as the legality of certain specific acts allegedly occurring in the 
present situation in Iraq. 
Cyberwar in NIAC: Some Generalities 
There is no treaty of IHL that specifically regulates the conduct of hostilities or the 
protection of victims of armed conflict in the cyber context; nor is there clear evidence of 
normative customary international law on point in the form of state practice and opinio 
juris. States are wary, for a variety of reasons, of making express pronouncements on their 
views of the existence or content of any specific customary law of cyber operations; nor is 
there any appetite on the part of states for the kind of multilateral law-making exercise that 
would be necessary for the adoption of a new treaty on the topic. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has expressed the view that “means and methods of 
warfare which resort to cyber technology are subject to IHL just as any new weapon or 
delivery system has been so far when used in an armed conflict by or on behalf of a party to 
such conflict,”3 although this does not necessarily represent the settled view of a plurality of 
the international community. In the absence of primary sources of law, the commentaries of 
scholars have become paramount as evidence of lex lata—the widely agreed default 
position being that the existing corpus of IHL applies, mutatis mutandis, to hostilities in the 
cyber domain.4 Academic writings on the topic have recently been boosted, albeit still in the 
form of non-binding “soft law,” by the publication of the Tallin Manual, an extensive non-
official manual drafted by an International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.5 Part B of the Tallinn Manual surveys the 
traditional corpus of IHL and discusses its application in cyber armed conflict, and 
unequivocally accepts that doctrinally the rules of IHL applicable in NIAC are capable of 
application also in the event of non-international cyber hostilities, provided they meet the 
relevant threshold for scope of application.6 However, in view of the nature of these 
authorities and the well-known difficulties in securing application of the rules even in 
conventional NIAC in many situations, it must surely remain a matter of some conjecture as 
to whether, and if so to what extent, any states engaged in NIAC might accept their 
applicability either de jure or de facto. 
The substantive rules of IHL applicable in situations of NIAC are to be found primarily in 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions7 and the 1977 Additional Protocol II (AP 
II).8 Common Article 3 lays down basic minimum standards for the treatment of persons 
taking no active part in hostilities, whilst AP II contains much more extensive and detailed 
provisions for the humane treatment of such persons;9 for the protection of the wounded, 
sick, and shipwrecked;10 and for the protection of the civilian population.11 Neither 
instrument says anything about the conduct of hostilities or the methods and means of 
warfare, including the use of certain types of weapons. These topics are, however, 
extensively dealt with in the law relating to international armed conflicts (IAC), and the ICRC 
has—not without controversy—suggested that very many of the same rules are equally 
applicable in NIAC.12 The Tallinn Manual specifically includes many of those rules in the 
context of NIAC within the cyber domain.13
IHL, Cyber Activities, and the NIAC in Iraq 
There can be no doubt that the situation in Iraq amounts to a NIAC, since there is occurring 
within the territory of the state protracted armed violence meeting the requisite minimum 
levels of intensity and organisation of the parties.14 The applicable law, however, is limited 
to Common Article 3 and customary international law,15 since Iraq has never become a party 
to AP II. By the same token, enforcement will present a serious problem: Iraq has never 
become a state party to the International Criminal Court, either. Whilst a United Nations 
Security Council referral under Chapter VII of the UN Charter would bring the situation in 
Iraq within the Court’s jurisdiction,16 the currently fractious relationship between certain of 
the permanent members of the Council would surely make it all but impossible to secure 
the necessary diplomatic and political agreement. 
Specific cyber activities reported recently in Iraq that might raise questions under IHL 
involve the use of social media to rally supporters and spread propaganda, the use of 
hackers to gather intelligence, the subversion of routers in order to obtain remote control of 
networks by the malware programme Njrat, and the deception of users with the result that 
they open booby-trapped attachments or access web pages that exploit vulnerabilities in 
their Internet browsers.17 Some of these activities are unproblematic in terms of IHL in the 
sense that they do not disclose violations of the law—although they are interesting enough 
to elicit some comment. The use of social media such as Facebook and YouTube would not 
seem to violate any rules of IHL as long as it is only for the purposes of rallying supporters, 
spreading propaganda or obtaining intelligence, or alternatively as a permitted ruse: Rule 61 
of the Tallinn Manual specifically provides that, “Cyber operations that qualify as ruses of 
war are permitted.”18 Included within the scope of such permissible ruses are “psychological 
warfare activities;”19 this would certainly encompass the dissemination of propaganda, 
which is not as such prohibited by any rule of IHL. By the same token, information-gathering 
(by whatever means) is not prohibited in situations of armed conflict,20 and may indeed 
constitute only computer network exploitation (CNE), rather than rising to the level of cyber 
espionage.21
Cyber operations will not qualify as “attacks” within the meaning of IHL unless they can be 
“reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to 
objects;”22 once they have crossed that threshold, however, they must not be targeted 
deliberately at civilians or civilian objects,23 nor have the primary purpose of spreading 
terror among the civilian population.24 Some of the activities reported in Iraq have 
apparently violated these rules and have been very selectively targeted, down to specific 
families or even just personal friends of people involved in the armed conflict in particular 
cities—principally Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, and Erbil. The effect of these activities, if it is to 
intimidate people into not supporting or helping others in connection with the conflict, 
would amount to a violation of Rule 36, but only if they rose to the level of “attacks.” The 
same qualification would apply in the case of cyber booby traps; the information available 
does not specify whether deaths, injuries, destruction, or damage has actually occurred in 
any instances as a result of cyber booby traps, but if that were to be the case, it would 
disclose a violation of Rule 44. 
A final point of interest here concerns the legal status of persons engaged in cyber hostilities 
in connection with the armed conflict in Iraq. Although the formal category of combatant 
does not as such exist in NIAC, the concept of civilians who directly participate in hostilities 
does, and has the same effect as in international armed conflicts: namely, that civilians who 
do so lose their entitlement to protection from attack.25 However, it would be necessary to 
show that the civilians in question are not members of an organised armed group and have 
been directly participating in hostilities on an individual, unaffiliated basis; furthermore, the 
acts in question would have to meet the three cumulative criteria stipulated to constitute 
direct participation in hostilities – those of adversely affecting the enemy’s military 
capabilities, having a direct causal link to the resulting harm, and having the requisite 
belligerent nexus.26 The information currently available in respect of the armed conflict in 
Iraq is not sufficiently detailed to permit such assessments to be made as yet. 
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